The Inevitable Battle
by Diana Loski
Confederate Soldiers
(Library of Congress)
The Battle of Gettysburg has long been established as the most pivotal fight of the Civil War. Many events transpired that led to this terrible conflict. From the moment that Major Robert Anderson surrendered Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, there was an inexorable path that led to the village of Gettysburg. It was, then, the inevitable battle.
The following incidents during the war provided the episodes that led to this climactic chapter:
The deprivation of war, exceptionally harsh in the seceding Southern states for the first two years, left a destroyed land with malnourished civilians and starving soldiers. The ravages of war reached far beyond the battlefield, and this was especially so in the Confederacy. Food shortages caused riots, many soldiers were poorly fed, in rags and shoeless. By the early summer of 1863, General Lee knew he had to bring the war to the North, and by so doing could dovetail a shopping expedition for his men. It also gave the beleaguered Virginia a respite from the constant barrage of battle, allowing farmers to plant crops and restore order in their towns.
The fertile, sloping fields of south-central Pennsylvania were ideal – in addition to the myriad fruit groves and fields of wheat and corn. This area in Pennsylvania also boasted springs of pure water and plentiful herds of livestock.
Had Lee’s men not been in such dire need, he might not have been so bold as to invade Pennsylvania.
General Lee was a dying man. During the last week of March, 1863, Lee was too ill to leave his quarters and sent for the doctor. After an examination, the general received the grim prognosis – he was suffering from chronic heart disease, and there was no cure. He was told he could die at any time. While Lee lived seven more years, he worried that he would not survive the war. He was concerned about his army, his beloved Virginia, and the problems that both might not overcome were he to pass away before securing a victory for the Confederacy. Additionally, his wife was in delicate health, and he wished to return home to her. Hastening to bring it all to an end, he invaded Pennsylvania in late June of 1863.1
The Confederate victory at Chancellorsville on May 1, 1863 made Lee, and his army, believe that they were invincible. The morale of the Army of Northern Virginia soared to inexplicable heights after the Battle of Chancellorsville. The Union army had outnumbered Lee four to one, yet Lee soundly defeated Joseph Hooker, the Federal counterpart, and part of Hooker’s troops were even routed. General Lee was amazed at the win, and related to one of his officers that his troops could do anything, “if properly led.” He was certain he would be the one to lead them to the apogee of the war.2
A Union captain who guarded some of the Confederate prisoners noticed their high spirits, even when captured. He said that their spirit “was much better than ours.” A Union general agreed: “They are more heroic, more modest, and more in earnest than we are.” It was this euphoric mantra that actually worked against the Southern troops at Gettysburg. Believing they were unbeatable, they marched right into disaster at Gettysburg.3
General Grant’s siege of Vicksburg caused deep concern in the Confederacy, and Jefferson Davis in particular. Davis, whose native state was Mississippi, was alarmed at the progress General Grant made against the populace in Vicksburg. Having augmented a siege several weeks earlier, the Union leader seemed unstoppable. Were he to succeed in capturing Vicksburg, the entire Mississippi River – and the supplies that navigated that great river – would be lost to the South. General John Pemberton, the defender of Vicksburg, sent many telegrams to Davis, each one more alarmed than the previous one, earnestly seeking help.
As the month of May waned into June, President Davis asked General Lee to march to Vicksburg and stop the siege. General Lee did not want to subject his army to such a march at that time of year. Besides, he was fighting for Virginia, and wanted to protect his state. He proffered another solution: he would invade the North, threaten Washington, and alarm the people there. Lincoln would send Grant back east to stop him instead.
Had Grant not harassed Vicksburg, there might not have been a battle at Gettysburg.
Gettysburg was a crossroads town, where ten roads intersected, making it a busy thoroughfare – just north of the Mason Dixon Line. Even before America was a nation, some of the crossroads existed. Prior to becoming a borough, Gettysburg had been known as the Marsh Creek Settlement. Long before soldiers in blue and gray came to Gettysburg, legions of travelers came through the area, going north, south, east, and west. Even George Washington passed twice through Gettysburg, in 1789 and 1793, as it provided the best roads.
The ten roads that existed in and around Gettysburg in 1863 were the Chambersburg Pike, the Cashtown Road, the Mummasburg Road, the Carlisle Pike, the Harrisburg Road, the Fairfield Road, the York Road, the Baltimore Pike, the Taneytown Road and the Emmitsburg Road.
As countless soldiers traversed the region to find sustenance and make battle, it was much easier to walk on roads than through fields and marshes, especially after the heavy rains that fell in late June and early July. The soldiers, then, naturally gravitated toward the roads – and those roads led invariably to Gettysburg.
Gettysburg lay strategically between Lee’s army and Washington. Neither General Lee nor General Meade had planned to fight at Gettysburg. The true prize Lee sought was Washington, D.C. He could not have headed straight for the Union capital from Virginia, as General Hooker (the army commander at the time, until Meade replaced him) was zealously guarding the city. By veering northward, using the Blue Ridge Mountains to shield his army’s movements, Lee hoped to lead the Federals away from Washington so that he could circle back and take it.
It appears that Lee expected Hooker to follow him, and was perplexed that Hooker did not take the bait. He learned later that General Meade replaced Hooker on June 28. Thinking that Meade would be cautious and slow, as he was new to command, Lee continued his plan. As the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac into Maryland and then into Pennsylvania, Lee first ordered his troops to split up and head toward Carlisle. He wanted them to forage, and felt that they had plenty of time before the Union army caught up to them. He was unpleasantly surprised when a spy alerted him that the Union army was excessively close. Lee then ordered his men to concentrate at Gettysburg.
Once General Lee made that decision, he knew he would have to fight the Union army around Gettysburg. He planned to “throw an overwhelming force on their advance, crush it, follow up the success…create a panic and virtually destroy the army.”4
He could not have known that within days an army would be virtually crushed and never rise fully again – only it was his army that would suffer that fate.
The North, which had for two years been the invader, now found themselves as the defenders at Gettysburg – and it would make a great difference in the way they fought. After two years of war, the tables were turned in the summer of 1863. The Union army would now defend the high ground and the Confederates would attack the heights.
While numbers certainly matter in battles, the inspiration for fighting is a moral issue that gives great strength to those in the fight. The North now had that inspiration to defend their homes, their families, their liberty, and they would demonstrate it admirably.
General Henry Hunt, who commanded the Union artillery at Gettysburg, said, “the same army is a different thing under different circumstances.” When the Union troops crossed into Pennsylvania, whether it was their home state or not, they felt as though they had come home. Men cheered, the flags unfurled, and kepis were reverently removed.5
More than one-third of Meade’s army hailed from Pennsylvania. This fact had serious repercussions for the Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg.
Since the Battle of Cheat Mountain in 1861, General Lee remembered the stinging recriminations that he received for defensive fighting from the trenches. General Lee was known for being an aggressive defender, which he demonstrated at Gettysburg. That was not always how he had fought, however. Early in the war, at Cheat Mountain, Lee had been rather timid, and his loss had been an embarrassment. Nicknames like “Granny Lee” and “King of Spades” stung him, and he vowed to never place himself in that situation again. The high numbers of casualties and deaths among his troops at Gettysburg are evidence of Lee’s pugnacious methods. Those losses, though, were men the South could not afford to lose.6
The Battle of Antietam and the subsequent issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation played a role in Lee’s determination to stay and fight at Gettysburg. In battle, it is not the number of men who live through it, but who leaves and who stays that matter. When Robert E. Lee retreated after the Battle of Antietam – which the Confederates called “a draw” as they inflicted just as much damage to the Union as the Union did to them – nevertheless was a Union victory. Why? Because Lee left first, and ceded the ground to his Union counterpart, General McClellan. Lincoln had been waiting for a Union victory so that he could issue the Emancipation Proclamation. On January 1, 1863, Lincoln did just that, an act that enraged the South. Lee was distressed by the outcome at Antietam and embarrassed at the proclamation.7
When the Confederate troops won victory at Gettysburg on the first day, Lee’s lieutenant general, James Longstreet, advised Lee to leave the ground, head toward Washington, and find high ground to continue the fight. Lee refused to budge. He would not cede any more ground to the North. He also was not sure if there were additional Union troops somewhere between Gettysburg and Washington – as General Stuart, Lee’s trusted cavalry commander, was not in the vicinity to alert Lee to that possibility. He was concerned that Stuart was not nearby, and did not fully trust the other cavalry units as much as he trusted Stuart. Remembering Antietam, he decided to stay in Gettysburg, and finish the fight.
True to his word, General Lee remained at Gettysburg for three days, his troops fighting vigorously to the end. With the incalculable losses of the combination of those days, culminating in the disastrous Pickett’s Charge, Lee had to, once again, cede the field to his nemesis George Meade. Slipping back into Virginia, the war continued. But the inevitable had happened. Gettysburg turned the Confederate tide, and Lee’s army would never be the same.
It is true that many roads lead to Gettysburg. Incidents that happened long before the summer of 1863 directed two determined armies, inevitably, to the terrible clash at the historic town.
Sources: Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968. Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative/Fort Sumter to Perryville. Vol. 1. New York: Random House, 1958. Freeman, Douglas Southall. R.E. Lee. Vol. IV. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934. Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
End Notes:
1. Freeman, p. 429.
2. Coddington, p. 24.
3. Ibid., p. 25.
4. McPherson, p. 655.
5. Coddington, p. 46.
6. Foote, p. 468.
7. Goodwin, p. 497.
